{"id":2681,"date":"2026-01-21T12:44:23","date_gmt":"2026-01-21T11:44:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/?p=2681"},"modified":"2026-02-06T13:44:27","modified_gmt":"2026-02-06T12:44:27","slug":"china-port-technology-standardisation-soft-power","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/china-port-technology-standardisation-soft-power\/","title":{"rendered":"China and port technology standardisation as an instrument of soft power"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Soft power in ports:<\/em><\/strong> these are the nervous system of the global economy, and controlling or influencing the standards that govern their operation is equivalent to having a decisive say in how world trade is organised.<\/em><\/em><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Early last year, members of the International Organisation for Standardisation<\/strong><\/a> (ISO)<\/strong> approved by majority vote, and at the proposal of China<\/strong>, the creation of Subcommittee 27 (ISO TC8 SC27)<\/strong> within this organisation. SC27 will be specifically dedicated to defining technological and operational standards<\/strong><\/a> in ports<\/strong> and maritime terminals<\/strong>. The creation of this group was received in the sector with a mixture of interest, expectation and, in some cases, cautious concern. And with good reason.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Standardisation<\/strong>, often perceived as a technical and neutral exercise, is in fact a powerful tool for economic, technological and geopolitical influence<\/strong>. And in this particular case, the fact that the initiative and chairmanship of SC27 fall to China<\/strong> is no minor detail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

China<\/strong> has been at the centre of international debate<\/strong> for months due to the growing penetration of its technology<\/strong> in Western markets, which in just a few years has narrowed the gap in quality<\/strong> and competitiveness<\/strong> with respect to similar solutions designed in Europe and the US<\/strong>. In particular, there has been growing concern about Chinese developments in telecommunications<\/strong> and data transmission systems<\/strong> linked to critical infrastructure<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Various governments and agencies have expressed concern about the possible capture of sensitive data <\/strong>when these technologies are combined with strategic assets<\/strong>, such as ports<\/strong>. In a world where information is as valuable as the goods themselves, the line between operational efficiency<\/strong> and strategic risk<\/strong> has become increasingly blurred.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From this perspective, the creation of SC27<\/strong> on ports<\/strong> and terminals<\/strong> can be interpreted as China<\/strong>‘s response to this climate of mistrust<\/strong>. Not a direct confrontation, but a more subtle move, in line with the soft power<\/em><\/strong> strategy that the Asian country has been deploying for years. A soft power that is not exercised through coercion or conflict, but through regulatory influence<\/strong>, industrial presence<\/strong> and progressive positioning in key sectors<\/strong> of the global economy<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chinese soft power<\/strong> has manifested itself in many ways: investment in infrastructure<\/strong>, participation in strategic logistics hubs<\/strong>, financing of projects<\/strong> in third countries and, increasingly, leadership<\/strong> in international standardisation forums.<\/strong> The logic is clear: whoever defines the rules of the game largely determines who can play and how.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ports<\/strong> are not simply physical spaces where goods are loaded and unloaded. They are the nervous systems<\/strong> of the global economy<\/strong>. They concentrate strategic transport flows<\/strong>, data<\/strong>, energy<\/strong> and decisions<\/strong>. Controlling, or at least influencing, the standards<\/strong> that govern their operation is equivalent to having a decisive voice in how world trade<\/strong> is organised. And for a country like China<\/strong> (the world’s leading exporter and a central player in supply chains<\/strong>), this influence is particularly valuable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, China<\/strong> is not starting from a theoretical or academic position. It has a very solid industrial <\/strong>and technological<\/strong> ecosystem<\/strong> in the port sector<\/strong>: machinery manufacturers, automation system suppliers, terminal management platforms, communications solutions and digital technologies that are already operating in numerous ports<\/strong> around the world. The presidency of SC27<\/strong> offers a clear opportunity to transfer this knowledge of technologies and operational processes to the field of international standards<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The question arises as to whether this is a (legitimate from a strategic point of view) attempt to reinforce the credibility<\/strong> and international reputation<\/strong> of Chinese technology<\/strong> by formalising it in ISO<\/strong> standards. Standards that, in the medium term, may become a mandatory reference<\/strong> for tenders<\/strong>, modernisation projects<\/strong> and investment decisions<\/strong>. In this scenario, companies whose developments naturally align with these standards<\/strong> will start with a significant competitive advantage<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The key question is how this process may affect European and American technology companies<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If the standards<\/strong> that are defined are based primarily on architectures<\/strong>, data models<\/strong> or operational approaches <\/strong>developed mainly by Chinese companies<\/strong>, the risk is not only commercial<\/strong>. There is a possibility that other players will be forced to adapt their solutions, incur additional costs or, in the worst case, lose relevance in a market increasingly regulated by standards that they have not helped to define.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This context highlights the fact that standardisation<\/strong> is never neutral. It is a space for silent competition<\/strong>, where decisions are made about which technologies<\/strong> become universal<\/strong> and which are relegated to marginal niches.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The establishment of ISO<\/strong> Subcommittee 27<\/strong> shows that the future of ports<\/strong> will not be decided solely at the docks or terminals, but also at the standardisation tables<\/strong>. For Europe<\/strong> and other leading nations in technological development, the message is clear: active participation in these forums is not an option, but a strategic necessity<\/strong>. Because those who are late to standardisation are often late to the market. Understanding standardisation as an instrument of soft power<\/strong> is the first step in facing this new scenario with realism and strategic vision.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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References<\/h3>\n\n\n\n