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The Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC)<\/strong><\/a> is the main technical body of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)<\/a><\/strong> responsible for coordinating international action against pollution caused by ships. It was established on a permanent basis in 1973, in parallel with the adoption of the MARPOL Convention<\/a><\/strong>, and its role was consolidated in the 1980s when it was integrated into the formal organisational structure of the IMO.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Its mandate covers the prevention<\/strong> and control of marine pollution<\/strong> from ships, including oil, harmful substances, sewage and garbage, and, increasingly, atmospheric emissions and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. It is also the body responsible for developing and updating the technical and legal instruments derived from MARPOL and other related conventions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In its working procedures, the MEPC<\/strong> usually holds two plenary sessions a year at the IMO headquarters in London, supported by specialised intersessional working groups that prepare the technical and regulatory texts for the Committee to discuss, approve or adopt. Decisions are, in principle, taken by consensus among Member States; exceptionally, when consensus cannot be reached, a formal vote is taken. The adoption of amendments to the conventions normally follows the tacit acceptance procedure<\/strong>, which allows the rules to enter into force unless an express objection is raised within a specified period.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 84th session of the IMO Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 84)<\/a><\/strong>, held in London from 27 April to 1 May 2026, took place in the shadow of a previous meeting where a lack of consensus had become apparent. In October 2025, the 2nd extraordinary session of the MEPC<\/strong> concluded without agreement on the Net Zero Framework (NZF)<\/strong>, following negotiations marked by political pressures of unusual intensity in a body traditionally geared towards consensus. On the final day of that meeting, 57 member states voted in favour of a postponement and 49 against, leaving the amendments to Annex VI of MARPOL unadopted and postponing the decision until 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The decisive pressure came from the United States, whose Secretaries of State, Energy and Transport publicly rejected the NZF<\/strong> days before the extraordinary session, whilst Saudi Arabia led the call for a postponement, which ultimately succeeded. In this context, MEPC 84<\/strong> was the first opportunity to resume discussions on medium-term GHG reduction measures, although differences remained evident between those advocating the adoption of the NZF with minimal changes and those calling for significant adjustments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nevertheless, the meeting concluded with a reaffirmation of the delegations\u2019 commitment to rebuilding consensus, and the Net Zero Framework<\/strong><\/a> managed to stay alive in the negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This article analyses the main outcomes of MEPC 84<\/strong> and the current state of a regulatory process which, six months after the setback in October, remains the cornerstone of the decarbonisation of global shipping.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The 84th session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 84)<\/strong> confirmed the broad support of the 176 member states for the net-zero emissions target<\/strong> around 2050, but also highlighted that the regulatory path remains open. Amid technical debates \u2014 such as the tender for the 5th GHG Study \u2014 and geopolitical tensions, the focus returned to the Net Zero Framework<\/strong>: there will be intensive intersessional negotiations leading up to MEPC 85 in an attempt to agree on a comprehensive package and avoid a patchwork of regional measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The first two days were dominated by an intense discussion of the Terms of Reference for the IMO\u2019s<\/strong><\/a> 5th Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Study<\/strong>, a key element in updating the evidence base that underpins maritime climate policies. Several delegations warned of the risk of bias in the selection of experts and called for additional safeguards. Others defended the robustness of the review system and the need to move forward without delay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the methodological front, support solidified for focusing the analysis on tank-to-wake emissions<\/strong>, leaving the well-to-tank<\/strong> component primarily for fuel certification schemes. Even so, the debate on how to account for methane, hydrogen, and ammonia highlighted the current limitations of real-world measurement and the need for transparent assumptions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There was also discussion about who should carry out the study. Several countries proposed excluding consulting firms, while the final position agreed to participate under strengthened conflict-of-interest safeguards. The agreement also included the creation of a steering committee and regular updates. On that basis, the IMO plans to launch the call for tenders for this study shortly; it is expected to be published in the spring of 2028 during MEPC87<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In presentations by external stakeholders, the IAPH<\/strong><\/a> and C40<\/strong><\/a> reinforced the message that decarbonization progresses faster when ports, cities, and their hinterlands coordinate. The Rotterdam\u2013Oslo green corridor was cited as an example of operational and logistical integration, and the role of port decarbonization strategies was emphasized. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Oslo, for example, has promoted 100% electric ferries<\/strong> through public procurement and local management measures: its urban maritime emissions footprint is reported to have dropped from 37% (2017) to 3%, achieved by combining penalties for not using OPS with incentives for zero-emission trucks. Decarbonization strategies for Los Angeles were also presented, as well as London\u2019s, which has set a net-zero target for 2040 and has a Net Zero River Plan for 2024 that establishes the roadmap.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Wednesday\u2019s session focused on the Net Zero Framework (NZF)<\/strong><\/a>, with 12 documents submitted by Member States and international organisations, and a discussion structured around two key issues: how to address outstanding concerns regarding the package, and how to move forward following the postponement of the October 2025 deadline. The overall tone combined a sense of urgency \u2013 stemming from the need for international regulatory certainty for investments already being made in fleets and in the production of low-carbon fuels, as well as those awaiting a final decision \u2013 with the acknowledgement of a persistent political divide over the NZF\u2019s economic mechanism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In terms of alignment, there was broad support for the NZF<\/strong>, with or without adjustments, from the European Union, Japan, Mexico, Brazil, Canada, Australia, Norway, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and numerous island Member States. Their arguments converged on three ideas: it is the instrument most consistent with the IMO\u2019s GHG Strategy 2023<\/strong><\/a>; it avoids a regional patchwork of measures<\/strong><\/a>; and, if well designed, the economic pillar (Net Zero Fund) can support a just transition, with a focus on island Member States and developing countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Beyond the differing positions, there was agreement on the need to address the distributional aspects of the transition (capacity, infrastructure, access to fuels and financing) and to maintain momentum so as not to slow down ship orders and investment. The overall picture is one of a diversity of views, but with a majority willing to continue negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In procedural terms, MEPC\/ES.2<\/strong> will not yet be resumed, as it has been agreed to strengthen intersessional work and to instruct the Secretariat to draft neutral Terms of Reference for the working group. The Chair\u2019s proposal sets two milestones: ISWG GHG 22<\/strong> (1\u20134 September 2026) and ISWG GHG 23<\/strong> (23\u201327 November 2026), as well as an expert workshop on chain of custody. The outcome of this cycle should inform the conclusions of MEPC 85<\/strong> (tentative dates: 30 November to 3 December) and, ultimately, break the deadlock in the debate on the NZF<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The session also addressed whether, and how, to cooperate with the High Seas Treaty (BBNJ)<\/strong><\/a>. The EU and Australia advocated coordination to avoid gaps, whilst Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Russia and Kuwait called for caution to prevent institutional overlaps. It was decided to task the Secretariat with analysing the implications and options for submission to MEPC 85<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, a political standoff arose over the Strait of Hormuz, straining the balance between technical neutrality and security concerns. Despite these differences, the majority of support centred on the safety of navigation, the protection of seafarers and freedom of passage, with repeated calls not to divert the MEPC<\/strong>\u2019s focus from its environmental mandate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition to the matters already summarised, MEPC 84<\/strong> made progress on several fronts. On energy efficiency<\/strong>, the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI)<\/strong><\/a> guidelines were updated to better accommodate dual-fuel and hybrid ships, and a discussion was opened to strengthen the Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP)<\/strong><\/a> as a lever for operational improvement. <\/p>\n\n\n\n On ballast water<\/strong>, amendments were agreed to the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships\u2019 Ballast Water and Sediments (BWM)<\/strong><\/a> were agreed, which will require evidence of the effective operation and maintenance of Ballast Water Management Systems (BWMS) and compliance with Standard D-2 (performance standard for the discharge of aquatic organisms), beyond the initial installation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n On air pollution<\/strong>, a new Emission Control Area (ECA)<\/strong><\/a> was adopted in the North-East Atlantic, with limits for nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulphur oxides (SOx) and particulate matter (PM). In the prevention of oil pollution<\/strong>, a new Regulation 12A of Annex I to the MARPOL Convention<\/strong> (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships) was adopted, relating to integrated ballast water management systems, along with its associated guidance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, regarding area protection, the Participants agreed on the Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA) for the Nasca Ridge (Peru) and its associated protection measures, whilst also considering a PSSA for the Arabian Sea and a MARPOL Special Area for the Nasca Ridge, amongst other measures. Overall, the volume of decisions and agreements adopted confirms the MEPC 84<\/strong>\u2019s ability to continue driving substantive regulatory progress, beyond the debate on the NZF. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The April 2026 MEPC<\/strong> meeting sends a clear message: the net-zero target<\/strong> is no longer up for debate, but the means of achieving it and the economic mechanisms involved are. The NZF<\/strong> remains the central focus, albeit with calls for significant adjustments, and negotiations are now moving into an intersessional period that will be decisive for the international regulatory certainty the industry is calling for.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n *Disclaimer: This English version has been generated with the support of AI-based translation tools. In case of discrepancies, the Spanish original prevails.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) is the main technical body of the International Maritime\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":28,"featured_media":5137,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[72,1,19],"tags":[106,145,167],"tipo_publicacion":[],"temas":[],"ano_publicacion":[],"class_list":["post-5130","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-energy-transition","category-sin-categoria","category-spotlight","tag-decarbonization","tag-maritime-outlook","tag-port-strategy"],"primary_category_id":72,"coauthors_data":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5130","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/28"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5130"}],"version-history":[{"count":12,"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5130\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5165,"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5130\/revisions\/5165"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5137"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5130"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5130"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5130"},{"taxonomy":"tipo_publicacion","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tipo_publicacion?post=5130"},{"taxonomy":"temas","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/temas?post=5130"},{"taxonomy":"ano_publicacion","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pharos390.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/ano_publicacion?post=5130"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}The 5th GHG Study Under Scrutiny: Scope, Governance, and Conflict of Interest<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Ports and Cities Make Progress on Decarbonization: Green Corridors, OPS, and Public Procurement<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Net Zero Framework: majority in favour, minority with the power to block it, and debate over costs<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
In another group, the US, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Argentina, Panama, Iran, Venezuela and several oil-exporting countries criticised the NZF<\/strong> in its current form. The most frequently raised concern was the potential impact on transport costs<\/strong> and, by extension, on food and energy security<\/strong>, alongside doubts about the availability and scalability of alternative fuels. Several delegations rejected mechanisms perceived as punitive or akin to a carbon tax and advocated for technology neutrality. The US maintained outright opposition to the price-based approach, arguing that over 50% of global shipping tonnage rejects it, though it agreed to continue the intersessional dialogue provided all options remain on the table.<\/p>\n\n\n\nWork will continue during intersessional meetings<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
IMO\u2013BBNJ cooperation and geopolitical tensions: the technical agenda is not immune<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Technical agreements and complementary measures: from energy efficiency to the protection of marine areas<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\nKey points and next steps<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n
References<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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